零售商具相对公平的闭环供应链随机微分博弈模型

Stochastic Differential Game Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Retailer's Relatively Fairness

针对一主导制造商和一零售商组成的闭环供应链动态系统,研究制造商回收模式下制造商的最优批发价格、最优回收努力投入策略以及零售商的最优销售价格策略的制定问题。利用Nash讨价还价博弈理论,构建具Nash公平关切参考点的"嫉妒/自豪"型的零售商公平效用泛函;利用微分博弈理论,给出制造商的均衡批发价格和回收努力投入策略、零售商的均衡产品销售价格策略以及制造商和零售商的最优值函数。研究发现:随零售商公平关切程度的提高,零售商会提高其产品销售价格,制造商会降低其产品批发价格,并减少回收努力投入;随外界随机干扰的增强,制造商会降低其产品批发价格,并加大回收努力投入以应对不确定性,而零售商会降低产品销售价格。算例结果表明:零售商公平关切程度越高,制造商最优值函数曲线下移,相反零售商最优值函数上升。

Considering a closed-loop supply chain dynamic system composed of a leading manufacturer and a retailer,this paper studies manufacturer＇s optimal wholesale price and recollecting effort strategies and retailer＇s pricing strategy under manufacturer recollecting mode.Retailer＇s fair utility with Nash bargaining point is constructed by Nash bargaining theory.Manufacturer＇s wholesale prices and recollecting efforts strategies,and retailer＇s pricing strategy,as well as their optimal value function are revealed by differential game theory.Results show that：As retailer＇s fair concern increases,retailer will improve sale price,and manufacture will reduce wholesale price and its recollecting effort.As randomness increases,manufacture will reduce wholesale price and increase its recollecting effort in order to cope with uncertainty,and retailer will reduce sale price.Numerical results show that：the higher retailer＇s fair concern is,the lower manufacturer＇s optimal value function is,and retailer＇s optimal value function is higher.