基于碳限额的寡头竞争企业定价和碳排量决策

Decisions of pricing and carbon emissions for duopoly-competition enterprises based on carbon cap

为了研究政府制定碳限额政策对具有不同碳排放水平的两个寡头竞争企业定价和碳排量决策的影响,研究了政府制定碳限额政策时使竞争企业利润最大化的生产决策,以及使政府获得经济、环境双重最优的碳限额政策。研究表明,相对于无碳限额约束下的收益,适当的碳限额约束政策均可提高两个企业的收益,存在一个最优的碳限额值使企业收益和碳排放量均获得Pareto改进;高碳企业的定价随着政府碳限额的增大先不变后减小;当高碳企业的基准碳排量大于低碳企业的基准碳排量时,低碳企业的定价随着碳限额的增大先减小后增大,反之低碳企业的定价随着碳限额的增大而减小,此时政府不实行碳限额政策将有利于碳减排技术的推广和实施。

To research the influence of carbon cap policy on pricing and carbon emission decisions of two duopolycompetition enterprises （high carbon enterprise and low carbon enterprise）, the production decision which made competition enterprises profit maximize and the carbon cap policy which made government obtain economy and envi- ronment double optimum were analyzed. The result showed that The proper carbon cap policy constraint could im- prove two duopoly-competition enterprises＇ profit by comparing with no policy constraint, and an optimal carbon cap value which could make enterprises obtain Pareto improvement on earning and carbon emission was existed. The pri- cing of high carbon enterprise kept constant and then decreased with the increase of carbon cap. The pricing of lowcarbon enterprises decreased and then increased with the increase of carbon cap when the carbon emissions of high- carbon enterprises are greater than that of low-carbon enterprises. Otherwise, the pricing of low carbon enterprises decreased as the carbon cap increased, and the government did not implement the carbon cap policy would be conducive to the promotion and implementation of carbon emission reduction technology.