影子银行的第三类风险

Moral Hazard in Shadow Banking

目前影子银行的国际和国内监管框架主要针对系统性风险和监管套利两大问题。对影子银行进行监管,其本意在于防范2008年国际金融危机的重演。但是,影子银行监管框架忽视了当时美国金融业中普遍存在的第三类风险:当(广义的)银行预期能够将贷款债权通过证券化和影子银行方式转让时,银行从业者普遍放松了对贷款人资质的审核,进而导致贷款质量下降,引发了其后的普遍违约。按照经济学标准定义,这类风险是典型的可以引起逆向选择的"道德风险"。考察危机前的历史可见,构成道德风险的三个要素包括影子银行体系中的信息不对称,市场对房地产价格走势的盲目乐观情绪,以及宽松货币政策引发的流动性过剩。道德风险是十年前国际金融危机的直接原因,也是目前中国金融市场必须面对的重要问题。

The domestic and international regulatory framework for the shadow banking system focuses primarily on systematic risks and regulation arbitrage. The initial purpose of this framework was to prevent the financial crisis from repeating itself, but it overlooked a specific type of risk arising from moral hazard., banks loosened their screening standards on borrowers before the crisis, because they were able to transfer their risks by securitization through the shadow banking channel. The lax underwriting standard was further attributable to optimistic plague and excess liquidity, in addition to information asymmetry. Moral hazard was one of the direct causes of the financial crisis in 2008. It is also an acute issue that regulators in China have to address with caution in the present. We discuss how the law should respond to this problem.