信息不对称、信息不确定与定向增发中的利润承诺

Information Asymmetry,Information Uncertainty and Profit Commitment in Private Placement

本文从信息不对称与信息不确定的角度出发,解释了有资产交易的定向增发情境下的利润承诺现象。我们利用2006-2015年中国证券市场中有资产交易的定向增发数据,探讨了信息不对称、信息不确定与定向增发中利润承诺的关系。结果发现:信息不对称会降低定向增发中利润承诺条款的使用概率,但提高了利润承诺实现的概率;而信息不确定会提高定向增发中利润承诺条款的使用概率,但降低了利润承诺实现的概率。在经过内生性等稳健性检验后,结论依然成立。本文结论对买卖双方、投资者以及监管部门具有理论指导和实践启示。

From the perspective of information asymmetry and information uncertainty, this paper proposes new explanation for the phenomenon of profit guarantee in private placement. Based on the data of private placement in China＇s stock market from 2006 to 2015, we discuss the relationship between informa- tion asymmetry, information uncertainties and profit guarantee in private placement. The results show that information asymmetry will reduce the probability of profit guarantee, but it will increase the probability of that the actual profit reach its target; otherwise, information uncertainty will increase the probability of prof- it guarantee, but it will reduce the probability of that the actual profit reach its target. After a series of ro- bustness tests, such as endogeneity test, the results of this paper are still robust. We hope that the conclu- sions can bring theoretical guidance and practical enlightenment to buyers, sellers, investors and regula- tors.