私募股权投资进入对上市公司IPO当年业绩的影响研究

Influence of Private Equity Investment Entry on Companies' Performance in the Year of IPO

无论是新兴市场还是成熟市场,经常发生公司在IPO成功上市后业绩"变脸"的现象,引起学者们的广泛关注。认证/监督理论认为,私募股权投资的进入能够显著提升被投资公司的治理水平,抑制控股股东机会主义行为,降低代理成本,从而提升被投资公司绩效。而逐名假设认为,为快速收回资本、建立声誉,私募股权投资会推动不成熟的公司急于上市,造成被投资公司在IPO上市后业绩下滑。因此,探索私募股权投资究竟对上市公司IPO当年业绩造成何种影响以及如何抑制私募股权投资的投机行为具有积极的现实意义。基于认证/监督和逐名假说两种竞争性理论,手工收集2008年至2015年中国私募股权投资信息和财务数据,实证检验私募股权投资对上市公司IPO当年业绩的影响,探讨是否由于私募股权投资进行盈余管理导致被投资公司IPO后业绩下滑,分析《暂行办法》和产权性质对私募股权投资投机行为的抑制效果。研究结果表明,私募股权投资降低公司IPO当年的业绩;私募股权投资通过应计盈余管理降低公司业绩,应计盈余管理是私募股权投资与公司业绩之间的中介变量,但真实盈余管理不是中介变量;在《暂行办法》实施前,私募股权投资降低公司业绩,但在实施后其影响消失,表明该政策变更能抑制私募股权投资的投机行为;被投资公司为国有性质时能抑制私募股权投资的投机行为,缓解公司IPO后业绩下降。研究结论支持私募股权投资存在导致公司IPO当年业绩降低的逐名投机行为,丰富了私募股权投资与公司业绩影响方面的研究,有利于利益相关者对私募股权投资及其行为的理解,对抑制私募股权投资的投机行为具有一定的参考价值。

Whether in the emerging market or mature market, the performance of a listed company that ＂suddenly turn hostile＂often occurs after IPO, and this has drawn many scholars＇ attention. According to the certification/monitoring theory, the entry of private equity investment can significantly improve the governance level of the invested company, inhibit the opportunistic behav- ior of the controlling shareholder, reduce the agency cost and improve the performance of the invested company. ]＇he grandstan- ding hypothesis holds that, in order to quickly recover the capital and build the reputation, private equity investment will promote those immature companies to go public not fully prepared, resulting in the decline of the listed company＇s performance after IPO. Therefore, there is positive and practical significance to explore the impact of private equity investment on IPO performance of lis- ted companies and how to curb the speculation of private equity investment. Based on two competing theories, certification/monitoring theory and grandstanding theory, we first manually collected infor- mation and financial data of Chinese private equity investment from 2008 to 2015, and empirically analyze the impact of private equity investment on the performance of the invested company in the year of IPO. Then we studied whether earnings management by private equity investment causes the decline of the listed company＇s performance after IPO. Further we analyzed the inhibitory effect of the policy ＂Interim Measures for The Supervision and Administration of Private Equity Funds＂ and the nature of property on the speculation behavior of private equity investment. Empirical results shows that, private equity can decrease the performance of invested company in the year of IPO and the performance by accrual earnings management. Accrual earnings management is the mediator between private equity and companies＇ performance while real earnings management is not. Before the implementation of ＂Interim Measures＂, private equity has a negative effect on companies＇ performance, but the effect disappears after the implementation of ＂Interim Measures＂, which shows that the implementation of ＂Interim Measures＂ can inhibit the speculation behavior of private equity investment; the invested companies which are state-owned can restrain the speculation of the private equity, and alleviate the decline of the listed company＇s performance after IPO. The conclusion of the research supports the existence of grandstand speculation which can reduce the company＇s IPO per- f^rmance for the year in private equity investment, enriches the research on the impact of private equity investment and corporate performance and helps the stakeholders understand the private equity investment and its behavior. There is also some reference value for restraining the speculation of the private equity.