简政放权、企业寻租与企业绩效关系的实证分析

Relationship Between Decentralization, Enterprise Rent-seeking and Its Performance

文章通过2010—2016年中国A股上市公司的实证分析发现,我国企业的寻租现象比较普遍,伴随着地方政府治理环境的恶化而日益加剧。企业寻租产生生产抑制效应和资源偏袒效应,前者抑制了企业绩效的提升,而后者则通过帮助企业获取关键资源而促进企业绩效的提升。通过新一轮的简政放权,能够有效地减少寻租现象,一方面促进企业创造性生产,另一方面削减资源偏袒效应,最终有利于提升企业绩效。

Through an empirical analysis on China＇s A share listed corporation from 2010 to 2016, this paper finds that in China the rent-seeking phenomenon is relatively more common and increasingly aggravates with the worsening of the environment of local government management; the rent-seeking has two effects： production inhibition effect and resource bias effect, and the former inhibits the promotion of enterprise performance, while the latter promotes enterprise performance escalation by helping the enterprises to obtain key resources; a new round of decentralizations can effectively reduce the rent-seeking phenomenon, and on the one hand, it promotes enterprise creative production, on the other hand resources bias reduction eventually promotes the enterprise performance.