第三方供应链金融的双边讨价还价博弈模型

Two-sided bargaining game model of third party financial supply chain

运用鲁宾斯轮流讨价还价博弈思想,构建了信息不对称情形下第三方供应链金融服务商与银行、客户企业之间双边讨价还价博弈模型,分析了服务商与银行之间的利率定价以及服务商与客户企业之间的利率定价问题.结果表明,在服务商与银行(或客户企业)的单边讨价还价博弈中,由于不知道与客户企业(或银行)达成的最终价格,只能得出对银行(或客户企业)的最优理论报价,而不能确定具体报价值;服务商需要将双边最优理论报价结合起来进一步推导才能确定与银行、客户企业最优定价的具体值.最后,案例分析了怡亚通供应链金融模式的定价问题.

This paper applies Rubens rotational bargaining game theory to model the two-sided bargaining game between the third party supply chain financial firm and either the bank or the client enterprise under in- formation asymmetry, analyzes the interest rate pricing between the financial service provider and the bank as well as the interest rate pricing between the financial service provider and the client enterprise. The results shows that the financial service provider can only reach the optimal theoretical offer for the bank （ or client en- terprise） instead of the specific price in the unilateral bargaining game, because the service provider does not know the final price agreed with the client enterprise （ or bank）. The financial service provider needs to combine the two optimal theoretical offers and some further derivation to determine the specific optimal prices for the bank and the client enterprise respectively. Finally, the actual pricing case of EA＇ s supply chain financial model is analyzed.