摘要
在真语句指称什么这个问题上,罗素和弗雷格的观点并不一样,前者认为真语句对应着事实,而后者则认为所有的真语句都指称真。丘奇、戴维森和哥德尔的弹弓论证表明真语句将有同一个指称。在某种程度上,这些弹弓论证支持了弗雷格的观点而反驳了罗素的观点。尼尔认为,摹状词理论可以使得罗素的立场不受弹弓论证的影响。然而,即使如此,真语句指称事实的观点还面临着其他的困难。
Russell and Frege hold different positions on the reference of true sentence. The former regards them as facts while the latter regard them as true value. The famous"slingshot argument"developed by Church,Davidson and Godel is often considered to be a formally strict proof of the Fregean view that all true sentences have one and the same reference. However,Neale points out that if we don't treat definite descriptions as singular terms,these arguments can be destroyed. In fact,the view that true sentences refer to facts has to confront with several other inner theoretic dilemmas.
作者
胡中俊
HU Zhongjun(School of Marxism ,Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, Chin)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》
CAS
2018年第2期16-21,共6页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
基金
江苏省社会科学基金项目"当代西方哲学中的‘莫尔纳问题’研究"(17ZXD004)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(30917013128)
关键词
弹弓论证
真语句指称
丘奇
戴维森
哥德尔
the slingshot argument
the reference of true sentences
Church
Davidson
Godel