论解释主义对彻底怀疑论的解答

On the Explanationist Reply to Radical Scepticism

当代怀疑论论证的一个主要形式是基于非充分决定原则,而解释主义则旨在反驳该怀疑论论证。解释主义者认为,根据我们的知觉证据以及最佳解释推理标准,日常情境假说比怀疑论假说更优,因此我们相信日常情境假说是有充分理由的。以沃格尔的方案为例,解释主义反驳彻底怀疑论进路的主要想法获得了清晰展示。但是,解释主义面临着来自三个方面的批评。首先,最佳解释推理本身需要辩护;其次,解释主义作为一种反怀疑论方案需要注意其有效性问题;最后,解释主义相比于其他反怀疑论策略,如知识论析取主义,并没有优势。结论指出,解释主义并不是较好的反对怀疑论途径。

In contemporary epistemology, radical scepticism can be motivated by the underdetermination- based sceptical argument. Explanationism aims to rebut this argument. According to explanationists, the common world hypothesis provides a better explanation of our empirical evidence than the sceptical hypothesis does. Hence, we are justified in believing the common world hypothesis. Jonathan Vogel＇s proposal shows how it works. However, three objections are levelled against this approach. First, explanationists need to defend the inference to the best explanation; second, one may wonder whether explanationism, qua an anti-sceptical proposal, provides epistemic justification, as opposed to pragmatic justification; third, explanationism is not superior to other anti- sceptical proposals, e.g. epistemological disjunctivism. To sum up, explanationism is not among the ideal anti- sceptical proposals.