摘要
雄安新区建立初期,急需引进高端人才完成新区的规划和建设。从博弈论角度分析,高端人才引进是高端人才和雄安新区政府之间的博弈,决策原则是各自效用最大化。通过建立混合策略纳什均衡博弈模型对新区引进高端人才的合理性进行分析并求出均衡解;在此基础上,建立委托-代理博弈模型探讨新区提供的物质激励、软实力程度、户籍管理政策、创新潜力与高端人才前往新区积极性的相关性。结果发现:最优物质激励与高端人才前往新区积极性呈反相关,新区软实力程度、宽松的户籍管理政策、创新潜力与高端人才前往新区积极性呈正相关。
In the early stage of the establishment of Xiongan New Area, it is urgent to introduce high-end talents to complete the planning and construction of New Area. From the point of game theory,the introduction of high-end talent is a game between the high-end talents and the government of Xiongan New Area,the decision principle is maximization of their respective utility. Analyzing the rationality of introducing high-end talents in Xiongan New Area,it finds out the equilibrium solution by using mixed strategy Nash equilibrium game model. On this basis,exploring the correlation between material incentives,soft power levels, household registration managementpolicies and innovative potential of New Area and the enthusiasm of high-end talents to New Area by making use of principal agent model, it finds out the optimal material incentive is inversely related to the enthusiasm of high-end talents to New Area,while soft power levels of New Area, loose household registration managementpolicies and innovative potential are positively related.
作者
刘兵
曾建丽
梁林
曹文蕊
李青
Liu Bing, Zeng Jianli, Liang Lin, Cao Wenrui, Li Qing(School of Economics and Managemen, Hebei University of Technology, Tianjin 300401,Chin)
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2018年第2期24-31,共8页
Economy and Management
基金
天津市社科规划重点项目(TJGL16-001)
河北省研究生创新资助项目(CXZZBS2017035)
河北省社会科学发展研究课题(201708110321)
关键词
雄安新区
引进高端人才
博弈论
混合策略纳什均衡
委托代理模型
Xiongan New Area
introducing high-end talents
game theory
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
principal agent model