股权激励对应计与真实盈余管理行为的影响研究

The Impact of Equity Incentive on Accrual and Real Earnings Management of Listed Companies in GEM

本文选取2013-2015年首次公布股权激励计划的创业板上市公司作为样本,分析了创业板市场股权激励下不同手段的盈余管理操纵行为。研究明:创业板上市公司在首次公布股权激励计划的前一年,存在明显的负向应计盈余管理;股权激励的实施强度与应计盈余管理无显著关系,与真实盈余管理显著正相关;不同的股权激励模式会影响企业的应计盈余管理程度,且实施混合激励模式的公司其应计盈余管理程度会比仅实施单一激励模式的公司更高;随着公司规模和高管薪酬的增长,高管会倾向于采取应计盈余管理,相应地减少真实盈余管理行为;独立董事的任命一定程度上能够监督抑制企业的应计与真实盈余管理行为。

This paper selects the listed companies which has announced equity incentive plans at the first time in the gem from 2013 to 2015 years as a sample, then uses Stata and SPSS software for empirical test to explore the different ways of earnings management manipulation behavior in the stock market incentive.The results show that: in the first year of the first announcement of the equity incentive plan, the listed companies of gem have obvious negative accruals earnings management;There is no significant relationship between the intensity of the implementation of equity incentive and accruals earnings management,but the intensity of equity incentiveplays positive correlation with real earnings management;Different equity incentive model will affect the level of accruals earnings management, and the level of accrual earnings management in the company with mixed incentive model will be higher than that in the company with a single incentive model;With the size of the company and the growth of executive compensation,executives will tend to adopt accrual earnings management, and reduce the real earnings management behavior;The appointment of independent directors can supervise and control the accruals and real earnings management behaviors to a certain extent.