成本信息不对称下双渠道供应链的协调

Coordination of Dual Channel Supply Chain under Asymmetric Cost Information

基于主从博弈和委托代理理论,研究了由一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链在成本信息不对称条件下的契约协调问题,在离散成本类型下得到了最优的批发价契约,分析了最优批发价契约对供应链的协调绩效,最后通过数值案例验证了批发价契约在实现双渠道供应链协调中的有效性。

Based on the principal-agent theory and game theory, this paper studies the coordination of dual channel supply chain consisted of a manufacturer and a retailer in terms of cost under asymmetric information. We got the optimal wholesale price contract in the discrete cost type, analyzed the performance of the wholesale price of the optimal contract coordination in supply chain. Finally, a numerical example was given to demonstrate the effectiveness of the wholesale price contracted in the coordination of dual-channel supply chain.