产能过剩与审计治理——基于审计费用风险溢价的实证研究

Overcapacity and Auditing Governance: An Empirical Study Based on Risk Premium of Audit Fees

产能过剩及其治理问题是当前中国经济面临的重大课题。文章基于工信部2009–2015年公布的各省份分行业淘汰落后和过剩产能的行政规定,以中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了产能过剩对审计收费的影响。研究发现:由于产能过剩,企业的经营、财务和政策等风险上升,会计师事务所为了降低审计风险而提高审计收费,表明审计费用存在风险溢价。进一步的分析显示,相对于民营企业,国有企业产能过剩导致的审计费用风险溢价更高;所在地区市场化程度越高,企业产能过剩导致的审计费用风险溢价越高;与没有政治关联的公司相比,有政治关联的公司产能过剩导致的审计费用风险溢价更低。最后,利用工信部公布的各省份去产能完成额度数据构建了新的产能过剩指标,文章的研究结论保持稳健。文章的研究表明,我国审计市场识别和关注了产能过剩带来的企业特有风险,并通过审计费用风险溢价向监管部门和资本市场投资者传递企业产能过剩的风险信息,从而对于化解产能过剩具有一定的外部治理作用;同时发现了审计市场对产能过剩治理作用的经验证据,对于新常态下的去产能、供给侧改革和经济转型具有较为重要的政策启示意义。

Since 1990s,due to the unique fiscal decentralization system,official promotion system,local government intervention and other institutional factors,China＇s problem of overcapacity has become more and more serious.In 2008 after the global financial crisis,because of government relax control over industry capacity and the subsequent four trillion RMB economic stimulus plan,the serious overcapacity occurred in some industries.Coupled with the slowdown of economic demand,overcapacity problem becomes a more and more prominent contradiction in China＇s economy.Resolving overcapacity is an important task of the supply-side reform under the new normal economy,and also a difficult problem to be solved to realize the sustained and healthy development of China＇s economy.In order to resolve overcapacity,the central government has begun to introduce a series of administrative measures to regulate and guide local governments to cut capacity.Since 2009,the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has issued the index of elimination of backward and excess capacity in every province,and has announced the completion of annual capacity indicators of different provinces.In this context,based on the administrative provisions from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology about eliminating backward and excess capacity by every provinces and using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2015,this paper examines the impact of overcapacity on audit fees.It finds that,due to overcapacity,business,financial and policy risks are rising,and accounting firms improve the audit fees in order to reduce the audit risk,indicating that there is a risk premium of audit fees.Further analysis shows that the risk premium of audit fees of state-owned enterprises having overcapacity is higher than that of private enterprises.The higher degree of marketization enterprises have,the higher risk premium of audit fees caused by overcapacity enterprises get.And there is a lower risk premium of audit fees caused by overcapacity of companies with political connections compared with companies without political connections.Finally,by using a new overcapacity indicator to examine based on the amount of eliminated capacity by provinces constrained by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,conclusions remain robust.In conclusion,in the context of China＇s current overcapacity and cutting capacity through government intervention,this paper shows that China＇s audit market is aware of and focuses on the specific risks of enterprises caused by overcapacity,and auditors increase audit fees by increasing audit procedures and risk costs to reduce audit risks.Risk premium of audit fees caused by overcapacity is essentially passing the risk information of excess capacity of enterprises to the regulators and investors through audit market,thus making auditing play a role of external governance in resolving the problem of overcapacity.This paper reveals the economic consequences of overcapacity at the microcosmic level,and finds out empirical evidence of the governance role of audit market in solving overcapacity problem,which is of great policy significance to capacity cutting,supply-side reform and economic transformation in the new normal economy.