审计师感知分析师行为的新解释——一个关于分析师调研行为的探索

New Explanation of Auditor's Perception of Analysts' Behavior:——An exploration on the survey behavior of analysts

近年来分析师行为过程研究成为焦点,文章基于信息披露与声誉压力机制,探索分析师参与调研行为及其特征对审计投入的影响。实证结果表明:相较于调研后未发布预测的分析师而言,审计师对调研后不同期间内发布盈余预测的分析师行为感知明显;分析师在短时间内发布预测会引起审计师更多关注与投入,且这种现象主要表现在低声誉事务所审计的上市公司中;分析师路演活动的调研方式会引起审计投入增加,但并未强化审计师对调研后短时间发布预测分析师行为的关注。据此,提出相关建议,为最大限度提升分析师与审计师行为互动效应、充分发挥调研作用并最终形成有效的协同外部治理机制提供一定程度的借鉴与参考。

The behavior process research of analysts has been the focus of the analyst research. Based on the information disclosure mechanism and reputation and pressure mechanism, the paper explores the influence of analysts＇ behavior during surveys and its characteristics on audit investment. The empirical results show that compared with the analysts who do not release forecasts after surveys, the auditor＇s perception of analysts＇ behavior on earnings forecasts released in different periods is obvious. Among analysts＇ behavior perception in different periods after surveys, the analysts issuing earnings forecast after a shorter period of time will draw more attention and audit investment, which mainly exists in lower reputation firms. The analysts＇ roadshow significantly increases the audit input, but does not intensify the auditors＇ attention on the behavior of analysts＇ who issue forecasts in a shorter time after surveys. Accordingly, it puts forward relevant suggestions, to provide reference to maximize analysts and auditors behavior interaction,give full play to the role of survey and eventually form an effective synergistic mechanism on external governance.