介于感性与知性:康德、梅洛-庞蒂以及理性批判

Between Sensibility and Understanding:Kant and Merleau-Ponty and the Critique of Reason

康德的批判哲学或隐或显地对梅洛—庞蒂的《知觉现象学》产生了巨大的影响。本文认为,我们可以将梅洛—庞蒂的文本理解为:基于生活经验的矛盾结构,对《纯粹理性批判》的现象学重述,而这一矛盾结构则清晰地存在于康德的先验美学和先验分析当中。尽管胡塞尔和海德格尔对康德的第一版先验演绎的解读影响了梅洛—庞蒂,但是他还是发展出一个在康德、胡塞尔和海德格尔之间的独特视角。因为梅洛—庞蒂的涉身的(embodied)、生活的综合实际上瓦解了康德对感性和知性的区分,并且最终使得时间感和主体感成为矛盾的轨迹。

Whether explicitly or implicitly,Kant＇s critical project weighs heavily upon Merleau-Ponty＇s Phe- nomenology of Perception. This article argues that we can understand Merleau-Ponty＇s text as a phenome- nological rewriting of the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experi- ence, effectively merging Kant＇s Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although he was in uenced by Husserl＇s and Heidegger＇s interpretations of Kant＇s first version of the Transcendental De- duction,Merleau-Ponty develops a unique position between Kant, Husserl,and Heidegger via an embodied and lived synthesis that collapses Kant＇s distinction between sensibility and the understanding,and that makes sense of temporality and subjectivity as a paradoxical trajectory.