概念的异质性学说剖析

An Examination of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis of Concept

马歇瑞(E.Machery)的C概念学说及异质性概念假说认为,概念本身并不构成科学意义上的自然类,但其次级范畴(原型、范例和理论)却构成三个彼此异质的自然类,因而应该用"原型"、"范例"和"理论"这三种基本概念类型的名称代替"概念",并把"概念"从认知科学理论术语中消去。本文经过深入分析后认为,马歇瑞对C概念学说及异质性概念假说的论证不充分,不足以得出消去"概念"的结论,概念的自然类地位尚待进一步研究。

In his C account and Heterogeneity Hypothesis of concepts, Machery argues that concepts are not a natural kind while the second-order concepts （prototypes, exemplars, and theories） are respectively a natural kind. So the term ＂concept＂ should be substituted by the names of those three kinds of concepts and be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology. This paper will argue that Machery＇s arguments for his C account and Heterogeneity Hypothesis are too unconvincing to conclude that the term ＂concept＂ should be eliminated.