信息不对称下考虑消费者品牌偏好的激励策略

在需求信息不对称和消费者具有品牌偏好的背景下,本文通过构建stackelberg博弈模型,研究了零售商需求信息共享和不共享两种情况对供应链的影响。研究表明:预测信息精度、品牌敏感系数提高有利于供应链整体利润提高,而品牌投入成本系数增加降低了供应链整体利润;需求信息共享使得零售商利润减少,但龙头企业从信息共享中获利;通过龙头企业对零售商信息共享激励,可以实现零售商和龙头企业的双赢。因此,零售企业要以顾客为导向,了解顾客需求的变化,提高信息搜集和识别能力。制造企业一方面要加强品牌建设,提高品牌的知名度和美誉度,通过品牌建设提高企业竞争力;另一方面要加强供应链伙伴间协作,建立收益共享的利润分配机制。

Under the background of asymmetric demand information and brand preference of consumers, this paper studies the influence of retailer demand information sharing and non-sharing on supply chain by constructing Stackelberg game model. The results show that： accuracy of prediction information and brand sensitivity coefficient can improve overall supply chain profit, but the improvement of brand cost coefficient reduces the overall supply chain profit; demand information sharing would reduce the retailer’s profit, which would improve the profit of the leading enterprise; the mechanism of information sharing which leading enterprise compensates the retailer is developed to motivate the retailer to share his information with the manufacturer. Therefore, retail enterprises should be customer-oriented, improve information collection and recognition capabilities, and understand the change of customer demand. Manufacturing enterprises should not only pay attention to brand construction in order to enhance brand awareness and reputation and improve the competitiveness of the enterprises,but also strengthen the cooperation among supply chain partners and build up the profit-sharing mechanism of revenue sharing.