基于委托—代理的路径诱导接受率的激励机制研究

Research on the Incentive Mechanism for Induced Acceptance Rate Based on the Principal-agent Theory

城市交通最大的问题是交通路网上的交通流分配不均,出行者获得的有效路网信息有限,如何有效地分流,让出行者接受诱导,并按诱导路线行驶是目前亟待解决的问题。目前交通诱导面临的难题为交通系统的诱导接受率问题,路径诱导的接受率即提供的路径规划是否满足出行者的出行需求。尝试用委托代理理论来研究诱导路径的选择率问题,将政府作为委托人,制定相应的政策,出行者作为代理人,根据政府的政策选择相应的行为。政府的目的是制定相应的政策能有效地激励出行者接受诱导,提高诱导率。

The biggest problem of urban traffic is the uneven distribution of traffic flow on the road network and the effective road network information is limited by travelers.How to effectively split that travelers can receive induction and ride according to the inducing route is an urgent problem.Currently,the problem of the induced traffic system is the acceptance rate which is whether the induced paths meet the traveler＇s needs.Based on previous studies,we try to use the principal-agent theory,regarding the government as the principal and the agent for the traveler,to analyze the principal-agent relationship between government policy and the travelers.It will be established a principal-agent model that the government will effectively encourage travelers to accept induced transfer policy in order to improve the induction acceptance rate.