融券卖空机制是否抑制了上市公司过度投资?

Can Bond Short Selling Constrain Over-investment of Listed Companies?

过度投资与重复建设是我国改革开放以来经济增长中的顽疾。为发现更多的对过度投资的外部治理工具与途径,本文以我国2007-2016年A股上市公司为样本,运用混合回归模型和logit模型,实证分析融券卖空与过度投资之间的关系。研究结果表明,当公司面临较差的投资机会却依然扩大投资规模时,卖空交易者能够识别并对其进行卖空,而融券卖空也在一定程度上降低了公司发生严重过度投资的概率。使用双重差分模型和双重差分倾向得分匹配法以及卖空量的残差来解决内生性问题,发现上述结论依然成立。卖空机制能够通过"自律效应"、"霍桑效应"以及提高会计信息质量来有效抑制过度投资,但通过"反馈效应"抑制过度投资的效果不明显,融资买入对过度投资不存在显著影响。因此,放松卖空限制有助于抑制过度投资动机,提高公司价值,完善公司治理。

Over-investment and repeated construction are the stubborn diseases in economic growth since China＇s reform and opening to the outside world. To find out more external governance tools and ways for over-investment, this paper uses A shares listed company dataset from 2007 to 2016 in China to examine the interactive relationship between shortselling and over-investment through Mixed Regression Model and Logit Regression Model. The research shows that when investment opportunity declines, if the corporation is still expanding its investment scale, the investors in financial mar- kets will take advantage of the ＂bad news＂ and short sell the stock, and securities lending short selling also reduces the probability of a company＇s serious over-investment to a certain extent. After controlling for possible endogenous problem with Difference-in-Difference approaches, Propensity Score Matching and the residual of short-selling flow, the above result shows robust. Moreover, the paper finds short selling can reduce over-investment through channels such as ＂Selfdiscipline effect＂, ＂Hawthorne effect＂ and ＂improving accounting information quality＂. However, ＂Feedback effect＂ and margin trading have no significant effect on over-investment. Therefore, short selling can constrain over-investment and improve corporate value, perfecting company management.