美国标准必要专利中反向劫持问题研究

Research on Patent Holdout Issues of Standard-Essential Patents in the United States

产业界、司法界和学术界比较关注标准必要专利中的专利劫持问题,对反向劫持问题研究较少。由于合理非歧视(Reasonable And Non-Discrimination,简称"RAND")承诺的模糊性和近年来美国对于禁令救济的谨慎态度,实践中,出现了标准实施者在已经使用标准必要专利的情况下,恶意拖延许可谈判或以反垄断举报为要挟,向标准必要专利权人寻求较低许可费率或许可条件的反向劫持现象。反向劫持损害标准必要专利权人利益,影响专利权人投资创新和将专利贡献给标准的积极性。美国法院和反垄断执法机构已经注意到反向劫持的危害性,正试图加以规制,其经验值得我国参考借鉴。

While the industry,the judiciary and the academ ia have paidmuch attention to the patent holdup issues of standard-essential patents( referred to as"SEP"),there have been,so far,little research on patent holdout issues. Due to the ambiguity of reasonable and non-discrim inatory( referred to as"RAN D ") commitments and the prudential attitudes towards injunction relief in the U. S. in recent years,in practice,the patent holdout has arisen when SEP implem enters who have already used SEPs maliciously delay negotiations on patent licensing or threaten to report to antitrust enforcement agencies for seeking lower royalty rates or licensing conditions. Patent holdout damages the interests of SEP holders,and thus impacts patent holders' incentive to invest in innovations and contribute their patented technologies to standards. U. S. courts and antitrust enforcement agencies are already aware of the prejudice of patent holdout,and are attempting to regu-late patent holdout issues,which has offered valuable experiences to C hina.