国有企业高管权力与股价同步性

Executive Power of State-owned Enterprises and Stock Price Synchronicity

伴随着国企改革的深入,国有企业的高管逐步获得了包括生产经营投资融资和人事方面的自主权,企业高管的权力不断增大。但是高管权力的增大也带来了严重的"内部人控制"问题。立足国有企业,从企业内部高管权力视角研究高管权力对股价同步性的影响,考察政府干预和产品市场竞争等对高管权力与股价同步性关系的影响,结果表明:(1)高管权力大小与股价同步性显著正相关;(2)处于政府干预多的地区的国有企业,高管权力对股价同步性有显著正向影响,反之,高管权力与股价同步性无显著关系;(3)处于产品市场竞争程度低的行业的国有企业,高管权力与股价同步性显著正相关,但当产品市场竞争加剧时,高管权力对股价同步性无显著影响。进一步研究还显示,较之于中央政府控股的国有企业,地方政府控制的国有企业的高管权力与股价同步性关系更为显著。

We study the relationship between the executive power and stock price synchronicity of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of enterprise internal executive power; we also investigate the government intervention and product market competition impacting on the relationship between executive power and stock price synchronicity. Through empirical tests,this paper draws the following conclusions：（ 1） executive power is has a significant positive correlation with stock price synchronicity;（ 2） the more government intervention in the region where state-owned enterprises are located,the stronger significant positive effect ofexecutive power on stock price synchronicity; and the less intervention,the weaker effect;（ 3） in industries with a low degree of market competition,executive power and stock price synchronicity have a significant positive correlation,but when the product market competition intensifies,executive power has no significant effect on stock price synchronicity. Further research also shows that compared with state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government,the executive power of state-owned enterprises controlled by local government impacts on stock price synchronicity more significantly. This paper deepens the research on the executive power and stock price synchronicity and has important value in guiding the reform of state-owned enterprises and the improvement of the capital market pricing efficiency.