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道德知识论的核心问题及其争议 被引量:3

Key Issues in Contemporary Moral Epistemology
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摘要 道德知识论是元伦理学和知识论的交叉研究,着重探讨道德知识是否可能以及如何可能等基本问题。对道德知识怀疑论的回应、道德知识的性质以及道德知识的确证,是道德知识论的核心问题。道德知识论在当代元伦理学和知识论研究中之所以长期未受重视,与人们对道德知识在知识论意义上的理解过于狭隘有关。从更为广义的知识论视角来理解道德知识,有助于回应道德知识怀疑论,并解决或消解关于道德知识的性质和确证的诸多争议。重视道德知识论研究,既能够为道德理论提供更为坚实的知识基础,又能够为知识论在其分支领域的发展提供有益的借鉴。 Moral epistemology is the study cross between meta-ethics and epistemology,which researches the possibility of moral knowledge,how we know right from wrong,and how we justify our moral beliefs and so on. The key issues in moral epistemology include skepticism and the nature and justification of moral epistemology. There lacks enough attention on moral epistemology neither in contemporary meta-ethics nor in epistemology,which is in partbecause of our narrow understanding. Thus,understanding moral epistemology from a broad epistemological perspective is the way to respond to skepticism and solve disputes on nature and justification of it. The focus on moral epistemology can provide epistemic support for moral theories,as well as suggestions for other areas of contemporary epistemology.
作者 王奇琦 WANG Qi-qi(School of Marxism, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, Fujian)
出处 《厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第2期158-164,共7页 Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)
基金 国家社科基金重大项目"当代知识论的系列研究"(14ZDB012) 中央高校基本科研业务费项目"道德知识论视域下社会主义核心价值观培育路径研究"(20720171090)
关键词 道德知识论 元伦理学 知识论 道德知识 moral epistemology, meta-ethics, epistemology, moral knowledge
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