股权结构、投资机会与企业现金持有水平选择——基于融资约束路径的分析

Ownership Structure,Investment Opportunities and the Choice of Corporate Cash Holdings Level: Based on Path Analysis of Financing Constraints

企业现金持有水平不仅受宏观经济环境影响,而且也受公司治理水平及企业内部财务特征等多种因素作用下的融资约束制约。其中,不同的股权性质、迥异的控制权结构以及差异性的投资机会均会影响企业现金持有水平。有鉴于此,笔者以中国2000—2015年A股上市非金融公司为研究样本,基于显性融资约束表现,分析了其在不同投资机会、差异性股权结构共同作用下对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现:(1)在面对迥异的投资机会时,具有较好投资机会的企业会强化融资约束对现金持有水平的影响。同时,由于国有企业的现金持有水平对融资约束具有更小的敏感性反应,所以,不管企业是否存在较高投资机会,国有企业均会放松由投资机会所强化的融资约束对现金持有水平的影响。(2)随着大股东对企业控制力的提高,即使其强化了融资约束对企业现金持有的影响,但国有企业现金持有水平对融资约束的敏感性仍然较非国有企业更小。同时,不管企业是否存在较高投资机会,国有企业均会放松由控制权所强化的融资约束对现金持有水平的影响。通过本文的研究,不仅丰富了企业现金持有偏好差异方面的学术文献,而且还为公司治理的完善提供了新的经验证据。

Corporate cash holdings level not only were affected by the macroeconomic environment, but also were restricted by financial constraints which were impacted by the governance structure and the characteris- tics of enterprise internal financial and other factors. Among them, the different ownership property, the discrep- ancy control structure and the different investment opportunities will affect the level of corporate cash holdings. For this reason, with A-share listed non-financial companies in china on the 2000--2015 as the research sam- ple, the paper analyzes reaction of corporate cash holdings level which was affected by investment opportunities, the ownership structure and dominant financing constrains. The empirical results suggest： （1） Facing different investment opportunities, enterprise which has good investment opportunity can strengthen the impact of finan- cing constraints to cash holdings level. Due to the level of cash holdings of state-owned corporate, it is less sen- sitive response to the financing constraints. So, no matter whether there is a high investment opportunities, the state-owned corporate can relax the impact on the level of cash holdings which were strengthened by financing contraints. （2） Even if big shareholder increased the equity control, it strengthenes the financing contraints im- pacted to cash holdings level in corporate. However, the sensitivity that cash holding levels were impacted by fi- nancing contraints were lower to state-owned corporate under such condition. At same time, no matter whether there is a high investment opportunities, the state-owned corporate can relax the impact on the level of cash holdings which were strengthened by financing contraints that were strengthened by enquity control. The paper not only enriched the research about corporate cash holdings preference in terms of academic literature, but also provided a new empirical evidence for the perfection of corporate governance.