政治关联、高管薪酬与盈余管理——基于民营上市公司的实证分析

The Relationship among Political Association,Executive Emolument and Earnings Management

以2010-2015年在沪深证券交易所上市的民营企业为样本,实证检验了高管薪酬与应计盈余管理的关系,并进一步用分层回归法探讨了政府官员类政治关联、代表委员类政治关联对高管薪酬与盈余管理关系的调节效应。实证结果表明:高管薪酬显著负向影响应计盈余管理;政府官员类政治关联会强化高管薪酬对盈余管理的抑制作用,而代表委员类政治关联没有显著的调节效应。

Based on the sample of private enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in years of 2010 - 2015,this paper empirically investigates the relationship between executive emolument and earnings management. Furthermore, the hierarchical regression method is used to investigate the moderating effects of the political connections with government officials and representative members on the executive emolument and earnings management.The empirical results show that： executive emolument has negative influence on accrued earnings management; government officials＇ connection will strengthen the inhilition effect of the executive emolument on the conectin earnings management,but representative members has no significant moderating effect.