摘要
并购重组作为资源配置的重要手段,在资本市场上发挥的作用越来越重要,与此同时,并购重组中定价问题一直是各界关注的热点。本文将资产收购关联交易作为研究样本,考察了我国上市公司产权交易中,大股东操纵标的资产定价的影响因素。通过研究发现,大股东的操纵能力、大股东的操纵意愿、评估方法的选择和交易支付方式对大股东的资产评估操纵行为存在显著的影响,而评估机构声誉的影响并不显著。
As an important means of resource allocation, M&A plays a more and more important role in the capital market. Meanwhile, the pricing in M&A has been the focus of attention from all walks of life. In this paper, we study the influencing factors of the behavior of large shareholders' manipulation in the property right trading of listed companies in China. Through the study, we find that large shareholders' ability, large shareholders' willingness, the choice of evaluation methods and payment method have significant effects on large shareholders'manipulation.However, the variable of assets evaluation organization' reputation is not significant.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第4期4-12,共9页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目"国家治理
国家审计制度与预防惩治腐败体系创新研究"(13AZD002)
北京市社科基金青年项目"北京市知识产权质押贷款网络信任机制与政策支持路径研究"(16YJC046)
北京市属高校高水平教师队伍建设支持机划"面向小微企业创新网络的公共服务体系构建研究"(IDHT20180514)
北京联合大学人才强校优选计划
关键词
资产评估操纵
资产收购
大股东
评估机构
manipulation of asset revaluation, asset acquisitions, large shareholders, asset evaluation organization