论“伪称”及其不理性

On the Irrationality of False Pretence

在科学时代，“怀疑”被誉为“进步的动力”，甚而怀疑主义几近成为受教育人士的风尚。但是，当肇始于笛卡尔的基础主义认识论把人为设计的、脱离现实情境的、不伴有任何惊异现象的“普遍怀疑原则”也当作一种重要的怀疑时，“伪怀疑”已悄然成为科学及哲学上一种新的风险。受此种“伪怀疑”的驱使，“常识”因为有“在将来被怀疑的可能性”便被认为不值得作为科学研究的出发点，甚至“科学”因为有对于“可错论”的承诺便受到怀疑主义哲学家的嘲笑。然而，实际上，只要我们准备去探究，就必须从一些常识性的初始信念出发。这些初始信念对于我们是别无他选的“既定前提”，虽然它们随着探究的逐步深入在今后可能会被修正，但至少在探究当时是“无关批判的”。妄图从口头上或纸张上单凭意志力去“怀疑”一些我们实际上并不存疑的东西，那是“不理性”的“伪怀疑”。除此之外，在当代哲学中还存在“伪称推理…‘伪称逻辑效力”“伪称不可避免”“伪称术语”等现象。这些“伪称”现象有的与逻辑规则的使用有关，而更多则是出现在逻辑规则运用之前或之后因此并不属于严格意义上的“逻辑谬误”。真诚探究，或许本应是理性的更深层次要求。

To claim in words at will that one ＂doubts＂ something about which he does not feel doubtful at heart, is just pretending to doubt, which has been called by C. S. Peirce ＂the most irrational thing＂ in human inquiry. In addition to this, there have been in contemporary philosophy other phenomena of false pretence, such as pretending to do a reasoning, pretending to have logical validity, pretending to be inevitable, and pretending to adopt a philosophical term. Whereas some of false pretences have to do with the application of logical rules, most of them do happen just before or after the right use of logical rules and so cannot be classified among logical fallacies in the proper sense. However, to stick to genuine inquiry free of false pretence, lies at the deep roots of becoming a rational, not just logical, philosopher.