农村信贷市场失灵的实物融资替代机制——来自江苏4市8县427户农户的证据

In-kind finance substitute mechanism for failure of rural credit market: a case study of Jiangsu Province

基于江苏省4市8县农户数据的实证分析发现,受到正规信贷约束的农户显著较多地参与实物融资,表明实物融资对银行信贷存在替代作用。相比于正规信贷部门,实物融资市场具有信息获取、实施监督和契约执行的优势,能够覆盖传统银行难以瞄准的对象。此外,实物融资内嵌的利率水平能够反映出农户风险和偿债能力,且与当地银行信贷利率相关联,是市场有效决定的利率。上述结论表明,在农村正规信贷市场失灵的情况下,市场会自发形成有效的替代机制。

Naturally-developed market failure in the developing countries has been ascribed to monopoly,information asymmetry,high transaction cost and systematic risk prevalent in rural credit market. Governmental intervention doesn't improve the financing environment in rural areas but causes "double failures"instead-market failure and government failure. This paper analyzes the possibility of spontaneous substitute mechanism for formal credit market failure. An empirical analysis of 427 farmer households in four cities of Jiangsu Province shows that the farmers who are restricted by formal credit market are more involved in trade credit market,which indicates that trade credit can be a substitute for bank credit. Compared with the formal credit sector,trade credit market enjoys the advantages in information acquisition,supervision and contract execution,thus attracts farmers who are not the target customers of banks. In addition,the embedded interest rate of trade credit is an indicator of the risks and the solvency of farmers; besides it is effectively determined by the market as is it falls under the influence of the interest rate of local banks. The results show that market will spontaneously form an effective substitute mechanism for the failure of rural credit market.