基于公平偏好的旅游服务供应链定价决策与契约协调

Pricing-decisions and Contract Coordination of Tourism Service Supply Chain under Fairness Preference

景区和旅行社是旅游产业发展中的两大支柱,也是旅游服务供应链中两类十分重要的节点企业。如何协调景区与旅行社的冲突与矛盾,一直以来都是人们关注的热点。借鉴心理学和行为经济学研究成果以及行为供应链的最新研究范式,将公平偏好理论引入由景区和旅行社组成的两级旅游服务供应链运作模型中,研究旅行社公平偏好对旅游服务供应链决策主体决策和供应链绩效的影响,在不同的公平偏好信息条件下,通过数理推导得到景区和旅行社的最优定价策略,并设计了实现旅游服务供应链协调的收益共享契约机制。文章主要结论有3点:第一,当旅行社公平偏好信息对称时,无论旅游服务供应链协调与否,旅行社都将获得比公平中性情形下更多的供应链利润;第二,在旅行社公平偏好信息对称且偏好程度满足一定条件下,景区通过制定协调型的收益共享契约能够实现双方利润的帕累托改进,且整个旅游服务供应链利润实现最优;第三,当旅行社公平偏好信息不对称时,分散决策下景区和旅行社的利润都将低于公平中性情形,景区制定的收益共享契约机制使其占有全部供应链利润但不能满足旅行社的参与约束。最后,结合所得结论提出了几点管理启示。

Scenic spots and travel agencies are the main pillars of the tourism industry and two very important node businesses amid the tourism services supply chain. How to harmonize the conflicts between scenic spots and travel agencies has always been a focal point of attention both for scholars and for practicioners. Traditional studies on the tourism service supply chain management assume that people are purely self-interested and, as a result, some of the conclusions do not match reality. From the research results on psychology and behavioral economics and the latest research paradigms regarding the behavioral supply chain, this paper develops a two-level tourism service supply chain model which includes the fairness preference theory among scenic spots and travel agencies. This way, we are able to analyze both the influence of fairness preferences on travel agencies＇ decision-making and on the performance of the tourism service supply chain. Regarding decision-making upon fairness preference information there are two types： symmetrical and asymmetrical. Under different scenarios of fairness preference, the optimal pricing strategy for scenic spots and travel agencies is obtained through a mathematical derivation, and the revenue sharing contract mechanism of the tourism service supply chain is thus accordingly designed.There are three main points in our research. First, the travel agency will receive more supply chain profits when the fairness preference information is symmetrical than when it＇s neutral, regardless of whether the tourism service supply chain is coordinated or not. Second, when the fairness preference information is symmetrical and the fairness preference level of the travel agency meets certain conditions, the scenic spot can design a coordinated revenue sharing contract to achieve the Paretoimprovement of both profits as well as optimal revenues for the entire tourism service supply chain.Third, when the fairness preference information is asymmetric, the profit of the scenic spot and the travel agency will be lower than that upon a fairness neutral situation, and although the scenic spot develops the revenue sharing contract mechanism to occupy all the supply chain profits, it cannot meet the travel agency＇s participation constraints. In order to visualize the main conclusions of this paper, a numerical simulation analysis is presented.Therefore, we propose several management enlightments hoping to foster a win-win cooperation model between scenic spots and travel agencies. These enlightments show that scenic spots should pay attention to the fairness preference of the travel agencies in order to maximize their own interests; that travel agencies should have the necessary strategies to convey their fairness preference information toward the scenic spots; and that both scenic spots and travel agencies should take the overall interests of the tourism service supply chain as the starting point in order to make the right decision. In a certain sense, this study is likely to promote the application of the fairness preference theory to the tourism service supply chain, while providing further reference to optimize its operation.