OEM/ODM代工模式下的最优研发补贴研究

Research on Optimal R&D Subsidies in OEM or ODM Foundry Model

通过构建一个三期质量内生化的动态博弈模型，研究了代工市场结构的变动、代工厂商的研发能力和学习效果如何影响代工模式，并考察了代工国的最优研发政策．研究表明：首先，无论第一期代工市场结构如何，只有在代工厂商的研发水平高于一定门槛时，外包厂商才会选择ODM合同，且代工市场竞争越激烈，这一门槛值越高．其次，若第一期的代工市场结构为独占，无论代工厂商的研发能力高低，政府最优政策总是不干预，而且如果代工厂商的研发能力足够强，在第二期可以自己争取到ODM订单．最后，若第一期代工市场为完全竞争时，当代工厂商研发能力较强时无需政府补贴即可通过自身努力争取到ODM订单；当代工厂商的研发水平和学习效果处于中等程度时，政府研发补贴有助于代工厂商在第二期争取到ODM订单．此外，还提出了上述研究结论对中国政府研发政策制定的启示，并指出了值得进一步研讨的问题．

Through the construction of a three stage dynamic game, this paper studies what effects are the changes of foundry market structure, R＆D capacity and learning effect by firms on foundry model and whether R＆D policy of foundry country can help the local firms to obtain ODM orders and what is the optimal R＆D policy. The results show that, firstly, despite the foundry market structure, only the R^zD level is higher than a certain threshold, will outsourcing vendors choose ODM contract, and the more intense market Competition is, the higher that threshold value is. Secondly, when foundry market structure of the final stage is monopoly, the government＇s optimal policy is not intervention, of course if the foundry＇s R^D capability is strong enough that will help it to win the ODM contract. Finally, if foundry market structure of the final stage is perfect competition, for those foundries whose R^zD level and learning effect are moderate, government R＆：D subsidies can help them to receive ODM orders, as well as improve social welfare, and furthermore, foundry firms with strong R＆D capabilities can strive for ODM orders by their efforts without R＆D subsidies. In addition, this paper also puts forward the enlightenment of the above conclusions to the government＇s policy making in China, and points out some problems worthy of further study.