信息不对称下基于回购的供应链金融决策研究

Strategies for Supply Chain Finance Based on Buy-back Requirement with Asymmetric Information

本文建立了一个由银行、资金充裕的供应商以及有资金约束的零售商组成的供应链金融系统。在传统报童模型的基础上,结合博弈论以及信息不对称理论建立了三个紧密相关的双层Stackelberg模型,分别研究了在信息完全对称以及信息不对称下供应链金融系统各主体的最优决策,对比分析了两者之间的差异,并着重研究了供应商回购比例以及零售商自有资金水平对于决策结果的影响。结果发现,信息不对称会导致银行贷款利率偏高,供应商的回购比例以及零售商的自有资金水平会对利率以及订购量产生影响,引入第三方物流公司实施存货质押并共享信息的模式可有效减少信息不对称造成的效率损失。

In this paper, we design a SCF system composed of a bank, a supplier and a capital constraint retailer. Based on the traditional newsvendor model, we employ the game theory and information asymmetry theory to build three models closely connective by which we analyze the optimal strategies of the SCF in the asymmetric and symmetric information circumstance respectively and consider the effects that the proportion of buy-back and the intern capital of the retailer will have on the SCF＇s performance. We conclude that the asymmetric information may lead to the high loan rate which can also be affected significantly by the proportion of buy-back and retailer＇s intern capital and that SCF can relieve the problem greatly caused by asymmetric information when the retailer adopts the inventory financing and the 3PL company shares the information with the bank.