审计监督下工程监理质量行为选择机理分析

A Study of the Mechanism in Quality Behavior Selection of Engineering Supervisors from the Perspective of Audit

传统工程审计对工程实体质量及参建方工程质量行为的审计监督较少,尤其缺乏对监理方行为的监督审计。针对工程监理与审计机构之间的多阶段博弈过程,从相关者利益最大化角度出发,构建了工程监理质量行为选择的计算实验模型,设计了不同审计成本投入、审计频率及处罚强度下的多种实验情景,通过计算实验得到了工程监理质量行为及收益等的演化结果,分析发现:审计机构需通过加大审计成本投入,使用高审计频率及合理控制处罚强度来规制监理单位质量反向行为。

Traditional engineering audit focuses on the legitimacy of the project cost control and project management,while the supervision of engineering quality behavior of participants is less,especially lacking the supervision of the supervisors.Therefore,a multi-stage game theory model from the perspective of stakeholders is built to evaluate the quality of engineering supervision behavior.The results show that the audit department should increase the audit cost,improve the frequency of audit,and adjust the punishment strength to constraint the reverse behavior of supervision department.