食品质量安全监管下经营者罚款与消费者赔偿的效果比较——以流通领域为例

Comparison of Effects of Fines and Consumers' Compensation on the Control of Food Quality and Safety:Basing Empirical Analysis on Circulation

食品消费扩大下的食品质量安全问题依然严峻。激励消费者参与社会共治监管体系,是政府提高监管水平的重要策略之一。基于演化博弈模型得到假说,运用双向固定效应模型验证食品流通领域中消费者赔偿激励的重要性,研究表明:在消费者鉴别投诉成本小于预期赔偿额以及政府监管资源约束下,提高消费者投诉赔偿额对食品质量安全风险控制效果更好;以食品流通领域为例,得到实证结果,即在假说前提条件成立的前提下,在控制食品质量安全风险效果方面,消费者赔偿金额是经营者罚款的3.3倍;在假说前提条件成立的前提下,赔偿概率对赔偿金额监管效果的放大作用是查处概率对经营者罚款监管效果的15.3倍,说明提高赔偿概率对消费者赔偿有促进效果。

Food market continues to expand under the quality and safety are still grim, so that, encouraging consumers to participate in social governance system is widely considered to be one of the solutions. Based on the evolutionary game model, this paperattempts to use the bidirectional fixed effect model to verify the importance of consumer compensation incentive in the field of food circulation. The main conclusions are as follows： Firstly, in the condition that theexpected cost of complaint is less than the expected revenue and the government regulatory re- sources arelimited, improving the amount of consumer complaints on food quality and safety risk control effect is better. Secondly, in representative food circulation field, the empiricalresuhisthatas hypothesis prerequisite estab- lished, the amount of consumer compensation is 3.3 times the operator finesin the control of food quality and safety risk effect. Thirdly, as hypothesis prerequisite established, the effect of the compensation probability on the supervi- sion effect of the compensation amount is 15.3 times of the probability of the investigation and punishment of the operator, indicating the improvement of the comnensation probability has the effect of promoting the compensation.