含有一个制造商与两个零售商的供应链战略沟通研究

The Study of Supply Chain Strategic Communication with a Manufacturer and Two Retailers

文章研究含有两个零售商和一个制造商供应链战略沟通问题,首次将市场的稳定系数、制造商对零售商的信任机制、制造商承担来自零售商的风险成本、信息的共享、利益与战略的相互作用以及从单周期到多周期的延续等方面来讨论三方战略博弈的可能性。其中,发现制造商可以通过改变信任系数的大小来降低自己的成本,零售商可以通过真实的共享预测信息来增加自己的收益。

This paper examines strategic communication issues between two retailers and one manufacturer＇s supply chain. It first sets the market＇s stability factor, manufacturer＇s trust mechanism for retailers, manufacturers＇ risk costs from retailers, information sharing, benefits, and strategies. The possibility of a tripartite strategic game is discussed in terms of interactions and the continuation from single-cycle to multi-cycle. Among them, we have found that manufacturers can reduce their own costs by changing the size of the trust factor, and retailers can increase their own revenue by actually sharing forecast information.