P2P网贷中双向交易者的双重信息价值及信息传递

Dual Information Value and Information Transmission of Two-way Traders in P2P Lending

P2P网贷通过聚集有关借款人的硬信息和软信息为市场参与者提供借贷决策的依据。除此之外,其他市场参与者的借贷行为是否具有重要的信息价值?这种信息价值能否被其他参与者所识别?本文利用"人人贷"的借款订单数据,实证检验了P2P网贷中一类特殊交易者——双向交易者交易行为的双重信息价值及信息传递效应。本文发现,双向交易者招标和参与投标的借款订单违约率都更低,因此其招标行为和投标行为都起到揭示借款订单违约风险的作用,具有较强的信息价值。进一步看,双向交易者招标和参与投标的借款订单更容易获得资金支持,这意味着其交易行为的信息价值能够有效传递,被其他市场参与者所识别并采取跟随策略。对比发现,双向交易者的投标行为比招标行为有更好的揭示违约风险的作用,对应的信息传递效应也更强,表明市场参与者还可以识别不同交易行为信息含量的差异。此外本文还发现,双向交易者的交易行为这一信息与借款订单信息在缓解信息不对称的作用上存在替代效应。

In recent years, P2 P lending has made rapid development at home and abroad. Compared with the traditional private lending, P2 P lending help both lenders and borrowers to reach transactions through the network platform, which simplifies the borrowing process and procedures, and reduces the threshold of entry and transaction costs for loans. Therefore, it is regarded as an effective carrier to realize inclusive finance. But it is undeniable that P2 P lending is still faced with the problem of asymmetric information. P2 P lending platform provided hard information and soft information about borrowers for market participants as a basis for lending decisions. In addition to the hard information and soft information about borrowers, the participants lending behavior is also the public information on the P2 P lending platform. Therefore, if the market participants＇ behavior has the important value of information. Can the value of these information be identified by other market participants？ Using the loan orders data from renrendai.com, this paper empirical test the dual information value and information transfer effect of a special type of traders — ＂two-way traders＂ in the P2 P lending market. First of all, our research shows that the loan orders in which twoway traders participate in bidding have a lower default risk, and the loan orders tendering by two-way traders also have a lower default risk. These indicate that both bidding behavior and tendering behavior of two-way traders have the effect of revealing default risk of loan orders. Further found, the loan order tendering or bidding by the two-way traders are easier to get financial support, this indicates that the information value of the two-way traders＇ trading behavior can be transferred effectively, other market participants can identify the information value and take following strategy. It is also found that two-way traders＇ bidding behavior has a better effect on revealing default risk than that of tendering behavior, and the corresponding information transfer effect is stronger, which indicates that market participants can also identify differences in information content of different trading behaviors. In addition, the information transfer effect of two-way traders＇ trading behavior is positively related to the degree of information asymmetry of loan orders, which show a substitution effect between the trading behavior of traders and the information of loan orders.