线上线下多渠道销售的酒店服务供应链契约设计研究

Research on the Contract Design of Hotel Service Supply Chain under the Multi-channel Marketing of Online and Offline

由于佣金率过高,目前越来越多的酒店除了接受来自OTA(Online Travel Agency,线上旅行社)网站的顾客订单外,还通过与推广商合作提升官方网站的客房预订量,并在线下门店接受顾客直接入住。本文通过构建一个由占主导地位的酒店与一家推广商网站组成的博弈模型,分析了官方网站的最优客房预留量,并运用契约设计实现了酒店与推广商合作时的整体协调。进一步,针对信息不对称的情况设计了一套契约菜单,帮助酒店规避利润损失。同时发现,只有当不同成本系数下推广商保留利润的差距适中时,供应链才可以实现整体协调。最后通过数值分析发现,合适的OTA客房预留量可使酒店和整体供应链利润最大化。当顾客点击转化率增大时,协调策略带来的酒店和供应链利润也会不断增加。

With the rapid development of network information technology, more and more consumers are purchasing services online and booking services in advance. This has brought great challenges to the traditional hotel sales business. On the one hand, the online booking service has increased the hotel＇s passenger flow and the occupancy rate of the hotel; on the other hand, the hotel should pay additional fee for the consumers from OTA, which reduces the rate of revenue. Under this circumstance, the effective coordination of hotel, promoter, and OTA will bring more convenience to consumers and the prosperity of the hotel industry. Hence, in this paper we consider a two-period sales model consisting of a leading hotel, a promoter, and an OTA. The hotel accepts online reservations fromOTA＇s website and official website. Meanwhile, it also services the customers checking in the offline store directly. Through the investigation of hotel service supply chain and the analysis of theoretical model, when the reservation amount from OTA is given, we can provide the best guidance scheme for the hotel＇s official website. We find an interesting result, that is, the cooperation of the hotel and the promoters does not affect the optimal reserve amount of the official website. And, this result is not affected by the conversion rate of customer clicks. In order to maximize the benefits of the hotel service supply chain, we have designed the contract to achieve the overall coordination of the cooperation between the hotel and the promoter in the case of completely symmetrical information. Further, we found that the hotel needs to reduce the number of reserved rooms on the official website when the number of rooms reserved by the OTA website is greater or the price difference between online and offline is greater. At the same time, when there are a large number of hotel rooms, the hotel should strengthen cooperation with the promoters to avoid the waste of resources. In this case, the hotel does not need to pay excessive fees to the promoters to improve promotion traffic. When the conversion rate of customer clicks increases, the promoter should adjust the number of promotion clicks to keep the rooms purchased from official website rooms increase. In the case of asymmetric information, we analyze the motivation of the promoters to misstate the costs and designed a set of contract menus to help hotels avoid profit loss. From the parameters of optimal contract, it is not difficult to find the overall coordination of the supply chain depends on the difference in profit margins of promoters under different cost parameters. Only when the profit margins are moderate, the supply chain can achieve the perfect coordination.