论机器人的法律人格——基于法释义学的讨论

The Legal Personality of Robots:Legal Prospects of the Subject Status of Artificial Intelligence

机器人及更广意义上的人工智能在现行法上并不具备主体地位。但民法主体呈现扩张的趋势,赋予机器人主体地位在法律技术上并无障碍。域外法对于机器人主体资格的讨论存在客体说与主体说两种观点。客体说中存在产品责任说和类推适用动物说等不同路径,而主体说中亦有代理说和电子人格说等不同论证方法。但客体说无法应对机器人的迅猛发展及智能化趋势;而主体说没有顾及人工智能尚处于弱人工智能的现实。在现阶段,我国对机器人法律人格的讨论应以实定法解释论为基础,在坚持人工智能为客体的原则下,运用拟制的法律技术,将特定情形下的人工智能认定为法律主体,从而为应对、引领未来人工智能的发展,奠定法律主体基础。

Robots and artificial intelligence in a wider sense do not have a subject status in the current law. However,the subjects of civil law show the trend of expansion and there are no technological obstacles in empowering robots with legal status. The overseas discussion about robots＇ subject qualification in the law diverges into two trends： objectivism and subjectivism. The objectivism includes the theory of product liability,the theory of analogizing the application of animal subject and other different theories. The subjectivism includes the theory of agency,the theory of electronic personality and other different demonstration methods.However,the objectivism cannot cope with the rapid development and the intellectualization of robots. Meanwhile,the subjectivism fails to take into account the reality that the artificial intelligence is yet to develop into full-blown. At present,the discussion of legal personality of robots in China should be based on the theory of the explanation of positive law and conform to the principle of ＂artificial intelligence as the object＂. In addition,we can take artificial intelligence under specific circumstances as legal subjects by the legal technology of＂fiction＂so as to lay further legal foundation in the face of rapid development of artificial intelligence.