再论王阳明的知行学说及王船山的批评

Revisiting Wang Yangming's Theory of Knowledge and Action and Wang Fuzhi's Critique

知行之辨在宋明时期是重要的哲学话题,本文运用比较研究法,从知与行的内涵、诚意与致知、良知与良能等三个方面对王阳明和王船山的知行学说进行深入探讨,对船山批评阳明所反映出的哲学本体论的差异进行挖掘。阳明哲学以"心"为本,心之本体即良知,良知在践履的过程中渐有扩充,这种扩充虽范围有扩大、内容有充实,但本质上孩提之时与成年之时并无区别。船山哲学以"气"为本,天地之气为先于任何存在者的全体大用,他认为作为起点的心、性,抑或良知,在人生初生之后日生日成,经各种社会实践不断充实变化。这种变化,在船山看来应该不仅仅是用强弱大小等词汇描述的外在形态改变,而且是二气缊神化后的性质改变。

The distinction between knowledge and action was an important philosophical topic in the Song and Ming dynasties. This paper employs comparative analysis to probe into three aspects of Wang Yangming’s and Wang Fuzhi’s theories of knowledge and action： （1） the connotation of knowledge and action, （2） making one’s will sincere and extending knowledge, and （3） intuitive knowledge and inherent ability. The focus is on di erences in philosophical ontology re ected in Wang Fuzhi’s critique of Wang Yangming’s theory. Wang Yangming’s philosophy is founded on his concept of the mind, and includes core ideas of the uni cation of knowledge and action, the sincerity of one’s will, and intuitive knowledge. In contrast, Wang Fuzhi’s philosophy is based on his concept of material force. Believing that Wang Yangming’s theory reduces action to knowledge and is too similar to Chan Buddhism, Wang Fuzhi redefines knowledge and action as, respectively, the extension of knowledge and effortful action. He emphasizes the accumulation of knowledge and the inscrutable transformation of the inherent ability of the yin-yang material forces.