董事高管责任保险与上市公司绩效——基于代理成本中介效应的实证检验

Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Listed Companies' Performance——Based on the Test of Mediator Effect of Agency Costs

基于沪深上市公司2009—2015年的数据,借助多元回归和中介效应检验方法,考察董事高管责任险、两类代理成本及公司绩效三者之间的关系。研究结果表明:董事高管责任险与公司绩效显著正相关;董事高管责任险在公司治理中发挥激励效应和外部监督职能,能够显著降低上市公司第一和第二代理成本;通过对两类代理成本的显著降低,董事高管责任险对公司绩效产生正的中介效应。

The directors＇ and officers＇ liability insurance（DO） is a hot issue of corporate finance and corporate governance,but the researches of the relationship between DO and the performance and the mechanisms were relatively weak. Based on the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen listed companies from 2009-2015,using the multiple regression and the test of mediating effect, the relationships among DO and performance and the two agency costs were tested. The results showed that there was a significant positive relationship between DO and the performance,DO could reduce the two agency costs significantly;By reducing the agency costs,DO could improve the performance significantly by mediator effect.