网络博弈视角下的地方政府污染治理

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLLUTION GOVERNANCE UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF NETWORK GAME ANALYSIS

本文利用网络博弈分析方法,研究了网络视角下环境污染治理与地方政府行为之间的关系。从网络模型出发,将地方政府看作一个由地理因素决定的网络,通过网络博弈视角研究地方政府的策略性行为对环境污染治理的影响。本文研究发现,本省环境治理投资与邻居省份环境治理投资密切相关。地方政府在环境污染治理行为方面存在着强烈的网络效应,环境污染支出表现为政府间策略性互补。这些结果表明,中央政府可以通过识别出省级地方政府网络中的关键省份,通过增加关键省份环境污染治理支出带动周边邻居省份提高环境污染治理投资水平。

Proceeding from a game model of network, this paper regards all the thirty-one provincial governments as a network decided by geographical factors and it also studies the behaviors of local governments and environmental pollution treatment. We find that there is a strong peer effect of neighborhood in the respect of environmental pollution treatment and strategically complementary behaviors among local governments. Therefore, the policy suggestion of this paper is that as the poiicymaker, central govern- ment should recognize the key province from the network of provincial focal governments and guarantee the leading role of key province in promoting the investment level of its neighboring provinces.