基于演化博弈的矿工脱岗行为原因研究

Trace for the motivations of the coalminers’ off-site behaviors based on the evolutionary game theory

为探究矿工脱岗行为解决办法,采用演化博弈理论建立了矿工与煤矿企业之间的策略博弈模型。首先根据矿工与煤矿企业间的利益相关性确定影响各方利益的综合因素,然后结合煤矿企业实际确定两博弈方的收益矩阵,进而利用演化博弈模型分析两博弈方进行决策的动态演化过程。结果表明,博弈方选择不同策略的概率取决于对手的得益,且两博弈方的策略相互影响,最终达到3个稳定状态,即（在岗,不检查）、（脱岗,不检查）和（脱岗,检查）。矿工坚守岗位与脱岗处罚、矿工损失、检查成本等因素有关,并结合具体案例进行验证,建议煤矿企业应加大检查和处罚力度,使脱岗矿工损失较大,以逐渐减少脱岗行为。

The present paper is inclined to build up a strategy game model between the miners＇ behaviors and the coal mine enterprises in hoping to explore a solution or proper approach to the miners＇ casual off-site behaviors in accordance with the evolutionary game theory.As is known,the condition of the static game theory is built up on the principle of the total rationality and comprehensive information,whereas the off-site behaviors of the coal miners are unpredictable and therefore difficult to predict or forecast in the working reality.Therefore,it would be impossible to make up for the defects of the game players＇ omniscience and omnipotence under the condition of the total rationality so as to enhance the theoretical basis of the entire game theory.In spite of this,this paper has been trying to identify and determine the comprehensive factors that may affect the interests of the both sides of the game players in accordance with the interest correlation between the coal miners and their enterprise with their income matrix in accordance with the actual business of the entire coal mining enterprise through an analysis of the dynamic evolution process of the both sides.The aforementioned analysis results of the dynamic game process of the miners help at least to find that the choice of the miners should be dynamically changing with the effects of the probability of the coal mine inspection in the direct manners.The actual stability of the miners is mainly dependent on and related to the forcefulness of the punishment for their casually post-giving up behaviors,the outside influential factors,as well as the underground accident sufferers in addition to some other related factors.The dynamic analysis of the above mentioned factors of the coal mine enterprises invites us to take into more comprehensive consideration the infavorable factors the coal mine enterprises have to be faced with.Among them,stress has to be put on the inspection probability of the miner off-sites and the inspection costs,the severity for the off-site workers＇ punishment,etc.The investigation results also demonstrate that the probability that the game players choose to take different strategies depends mainly on the opposite benefits and the strategies for the both sides to take to deal with their opposite partners.And,theoretically speaking,it is necessary for the game to reach the three stable states eventually,that is,on duty inspection（not check）,off-site inspection（not check） and off-site inspection（check）,for the miners attending to the post is related to the aforementioned related factors.And,finally,it would also be possible to verify a conclusion combined with the specific case and propose that the coal mine enterprises should enhance inspection and punishment so as to make up for the loss of the off-site miners so as to gradually reduce such behaviors.