基本养老保险系统集成度的演化博弈分析及仿真研究

Simulation of the Integrated Level and the Adequacy of Basic Pension System Based on Evolutionary Game

我国现行城镇职工基本养老保险制度面临提升统筹层次、提高待遇充足性等问题,而现阶段养老保险体系改革困境的制度根源正是由于中央政府、地方政府和企业三方的竞争、制衡。论文针对这一问题,运用改进的捕食者—猎物R-M模型,刻画这三个利益主体之间的动态博弈,设计实验分析基本养老保险系统的保费博弈。理论分析发现：提高养老保险统筹层次、积极应对人口老龄化、提高基金管理效率,多样化退休收入,不仅能提高养老保险待遇充足性,还能促进经济增长,但集成速度过快也会超出市场承载力而导致政策失效。实验结果与理论相符,此外,通过适度提升系统集成度来提高统筹层次能够降低最终保费,且使保费博弈更快达到稳定。

How to increase the adequacy and elevate overall planning level of pension system impede the reform process.By reflecting the dynamic process between the central government,local governments and firms,institutional origin in pension reforms is revealed,public choice theory and evolutionary game theory are combined,the integrated level of pension system is defined,and a promoted Predator-Prey Model is used to study how the pension reform in China（increasing the integrated level of pension system）can influence the relationship between central government,local governments and technology firms.It＇s suggested that increasing the integrated level of basic pension system,reacting positively to aging population,encouraging retirement income diversity and improving management efficiency of the pension system could not only promote a successfully pension reform,but also boost the economy growth.While over-integrated and fast speed of integrating will exceed the capacity of market,thus to lose the efficiency of the policy.