基于Hotelling模型的双寡头免费增值策略竞争分析

Competitive Analysis of Freemium Strategy of Duopoly Software Firms Based on Hotelling Model

软件产品的经验性和强网络效应使得企业往往依靠免费的基础产品积聚人气,再通过收费的增值产品或服务来盈利。现有免费增值策略相关研究多局限于垄断情况,对多个企业之间的竞争交互鲜有探讨。基于产品网络效应和消费者偏好差异,本文构建Hotelling模型研究了双寡头企业免费增值策略博弈均衡及其影响因素。结果表明:若网络效应相对较强,企业都应采用免费增值策略;若网络效应相对较弱,都不采用;若网络效应相对处于中等水平,存在"都不采用"和"都采用"两种可能的均衡结果,但前者情况下双方企业都能获得更大利润。另外,消费者对企业之间的水平差异越敏感,对免费版本的质量要求越高,企业采用免费增值策略的动力越弱,"都不采用"区域扩大,而"都采用"区域缩小。

The experiential characteristic and network effect of software make firms often provide consumers free basic products to build large installed base, and make profits from premium products or services. Existing freemi- um related research is more confined to the monopoly situation, and seldom analyzes the competitive interaction between firms. Considering the network effect of software and consumers＇ heterogeneous preferences for prod- ucts, we build a Hotelling model to examine the equilibrium freemium strategies of duopoly firms, and possible influencing factors. The results show that： if the network effect of the software is relatively strong, both firms adopt freemium strategy; if weak, neither firms adopts; otherwise, there exist two possible equilibria, ＂neither adopts＂ or ＂both adopt＂, but in fact both firms can gain more profit in the former equilibrium. Furthermore, as consumers become more sensitive to the horizontal differentiation between firms, or consumers＇ requirement of the quality of the free version increases, firms have less incentive to adopt freemium strategy, and the region of ＂neither adopts＂ expands, while the region of ＂both adopt＂ shrinks.