财政竞争、引资竞争与土地约束性指标管控政策执行偏差

Financial competition,investment-attraction competition and implementation deviation of land binding index control policy

约束性指标管控是我国土地管理领域的一项重要公共政策,但其实际执行过程却偏离原定政策目标。传统"央地纵向委托代理困境"视角的解释认为,地方政府追求土地财政和土地引资的动机是导致产生政策执行偏差的根源,但其忽略了地方政府行为所具有的空间关联性而存在解释力不足的缺陷。为此,本文立足于地方政府横向竞争的视角,分析了地方政府间的财政竞争、引资竞争对土地约束性指标管控政策执行的影响;在此基础上,通过2010—2014年间的省级面板数据,构建空间杜宾模型对相应理论假说进行了检验。研究发现:(1)地方政府的土地财政、土地引资行为会加剧本地区的政策执行偏差程度。(2)地方政府间存在"相互模仿"的土地财政和土地引资竞争策略,这使其土地财政和土地引资行为会产生正向的空间溢出,即在加剧本地区政策执行偏差程度的同时,还会同步加剧相邻地区的政策执行偏差程度。(3)土地引资的直接效应和间接效应无论在范围上还是强度上都要强于土地财政,这表明地方政府间的土地引资竞争是导致政策执行偏差的更重要因素。本研究的政策启示在于,为了促进土地约束性指标管控政策的良好执行,不仅要通过财税体制改革来弱化地方政府间的土地财政竞争,更要通过政府绩效考核改革来遏制它们之间的土地引资竞争。

The binding index control is an important public policy in the field of land management, but in practice, it is deviating from the original policy target. From the traditional explanation of ＇ principal-agency predicament between the central and local governments, it shows that the implenlentation deviation of policy is caused by local governments＇ motivation of seeking land finance and land- orientation investment, but it ignores the spatial correlation of local governments＇ behavior, so there is the defect of inadequate explanation. Therefore, from the perspective of competition among local governments, this paper analyzes the ilffluenee of local government＇ s land finance and land-orientation investment competition on land binding index control policy implementation, and then using the inter-provincial panel data from 2010 to 2014, it establishes spatial Durbin model to test theoretical hypothesis. The research reveals that： ①Local government＇ s behavior on land finance and land-orientation investment will aggravate local area＇ s implementation deviations of policy; ②a mutual imitation strategy of land finance and land-orientation investment competition exists between local governments, and as a result, local government＇ s land finance and land-orientation investment behavior cause a forward space spill- over. As a result, it not only exacerbates local area＇ s policy implementation deviation, but also exacerbates adjacent areas＇ policy implementation deviation; ③the direct effect and indirect effect of land-orientation investment are stronger than land finance both in range and intensity, and this indicates that land-orientation investment competition between local governments is a more important factor for causing the policy implementation deviation. In conclusion, to promote a better implementation of land binding index control policy, the reform of fiscal and taxation systems shall be taken to weaken the land financial competition between local governments, and more importantly, the performance appraisal system should be reformed to contain the land-orientation investment competition among local governments.