我国农村合作医疗制度改革的双层次互动进化博弈模型分析

Analysis on Chinese Rural Cooperative Medical System Reform based on Double-Level Interaction Evolutionary Game Model

农村合作医疗制度作为农村社会保障体系的一项重要内容,在促进农村和谐健康发展以及保障广大农民的身体健康等方面发挥了非常重要的作用。农村合作医疗制度的改革不仅表现在地方政府和农民之间的微观层面,同时也体现在中央政府和地方政府之间的宏观层面,地方政府是将这两个层次连接起来的纽带。本文从有限理性视角,通过构建双层次互动进化博弈模型来分析三方的动态博弈过程。我国农村合作医疗制度改革是通过宏观层次的"选择"和微观层次的"突变"而逐步达成进化博弈均衡的动态过程。通过兼顾中央政府、地方政府和农民三方博弈主体的利益、鼓励地方政府和农民之间微观层次博弈的"突变"和保证中央政府、地方政府之间宏观层次博弈的策略"选择"等路径有助于顺利推进我国农村合作医疗制度的发展。

Rural cooperative medical system is an important part of the rural social security system,which plays an important role in protecting the health of farmers and promoting rural economic and social development. The reform of rural cooperative medical system reflects not only in the micro-level between local government and farmers,but also in macro-level between the central government and local government,and the local government is trying to connect two levels. From the perspective of bounded rationality,the interaction of three dynamic game processes was analyzed by constructing a two-level game model. The reform of rural cooperative medical system in China is a dynamic process that gradually achieves the equilibrium of evolutionary game through ＂selection＂at the macro level and＂mutation＂at the micro level. By taking into account the interests of the central government,local governments and farmers,it is helpful to encourage the ＂mutation＂of the micro-level game between the local governments and farmers,the strategic ＂choice ＂ of the macro-level game between the central government and local governments to smoothly promote the development of Chinese rural cooperative medical system.