地方政府“稳评”政策操纵行为动态影响机制——基于博弈仿真实验研究

The Dynamic Mechanism of Manipulative Behavior in the Policy Implementation of China Local Social Stability Risk Assessment:An Evolutionary Game Test

建立地方政府"稳评"操纵行为形成的演化博弈模型,在博弈均衡分析基础上,通过Agent仿真实验揭示基层"稳评"操纵行为发生的演化路径。研究结果表明:第一,地方政府"稳评"操纵行为的形成是政府执行机构、"稳评"主管部门及社会群体的动态交互过程,其"适应性"的主体选择受到某些参数变化影响。第二,在有限理性条件下,不同群体行动的博弈支付矩阵、监督参与程度以及惩戒机制对于基层"稳评"操纵行为的形成产生密切关联,同时"操纵-监督参与"实施成本的变化,将会改变基层"稳评"操纵行为发生的约束条件和个体预期,进而影响到公职人员在"稳评"运作中采取蒙蔽操控的机会主义行动意愿。

The article constructs an evolutionary game model of emerging manipulative behaviors in the enforcement of grassroots Social Stability Risk Assessment（SSRA）,and applies simulation tool to disclose the evolutionary paths.The results show that：Firstly,the generation of manipulative behaviors in grassroots SSRA is a dynamic interactive process among government organs,SSRA supervising sectors and social groups,in which the＂adaptive＂choice is affected by certain parameters.Secondly,under the condition of limited rationality,the game payoff matrix of different groups,degree of participatory supervision and accountability,are closely intertwined with SSRA manipulative behaviors;while the implementation cost variation in ＂manipulationsupervision＂framework will change the restrictive conditions as well as personal expectations of SSRA manipulative behaviors and further alter the opportunism desire of grassroots bureaucrats in taking blinded actions for SSRA enforcement.