摘要
为了探讨突发水灾害应急管理中的合作问题,构建突发水灾害应急管理的异质主体网络体系,分析各异质主体间的博弈关系。在此基础上,考察异质应急主体行为选择——合作与不合作行为对应急合作达成的演化影响,将演化博弈理论应用到水灾害应急管理中,建立相应的演化博弈模型,进行稳定性分析,并对主体博弈形成的动力系统进行系统仿真。最后,根据演化博弈结果得出,中央政府加强监督管理和对不合作主体从重处罚将有利于良好合作秩序的达成。
In order to discuss the cooperation problem in sudden water disaster emergency management,the paper constructs network system of heterogeneous agents in sudden water disaster emergency management and analyzes game relationships among them. On this basis,the paper studies behavior choices' influence of the heterogeneous emergency agents ——cooperation and non-cooperation and introduces the evolution game theory into the emergency cooperation research,so as to build the corresponding evolutionary game model,do the stability analysis and simulate the power systems formed by the game. Finally,according to the result of evolution game,it is found that it is good for reaching a good order that the central government strengthens the supervision and management,and gives heavy punishment.
作者
褚钰
CHU Yu(Henan University of Engineering Zhengzhou 451191)
出处
《工业安全与环保》
2018年第4期54-56,共3页
Industrial Safety and Environmental Protection
基金
国家自然科学基金(U1304702)
河南工程学院博士基金(D2016035)
关键词
水灾害应急管理
异质性
演化博弈
动力学仿真
emergency management for water disaster heterogeneity evolutionary game dynamic simulation