业绩预告历史、经济政策不确定性与企业投资

History of Management Earnings Forecasts,Economic Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment

现有文献发现,宏观经济环境和管理层特质均可能影响企业投资,但对两者交互作用的研究比较少。以2003—2016年A股上市公司的季度数据为样本,检验管理层业绩预告历史所体现的预测能力(或特质)是否影响经济政策不确定性与企业投资之间的关系。研究发现,以往的业绩预告的准确度越高,本期的投资效率越高,但以往的业绩预告的准确度对经济政策不确定性与企业投资之间的关系无显著影响;以往的业绩预告的乐观偏差会降低本期的投资效率,而以往的业绩预告的乐观偏差越大,企业投资总量和投资效率对经济政策不确定性的敏感度越弱。研究结果表明,在企业投资的治理机制中应该考虑业绩预告历史所体现的管理层特质的影响。

The extant literature shows that both maero-economic environment and managerial attribute can influence eorporate investment. But the research on their interactive effects is scarce. Using the quarterly data during the years fi＇om 2003 to 2016, we examine whether the forecasting ability （or attribute） inferred from the history of management earnings forecast can influence the relationship between economic policy uneertainty and corporate investment. The results indicate that the accuracy of prior management earnings forecast is positively related to investment efficiency, but has no significant influenee on the relationship between economic policy uneertainty and corporate investment. When the optimistic bias of prior management earnings forecast is higher, the investment efficiency of eurrent period will be lower, and both the amount of investment and investment efficiency are less sensitive to economic policy uneertainty. The results indicate that the governance mechanism of corporate investment should consider the impacts of managerial attributes embodied in the history of management earnings forecasts.