“从严治党”情境下国有企业党组织的投资治理效应分析

An Analysis of the Investment Governance Effect of SOEs' Party Organization under the Situation of “Strict Administration of the Party”

国有企业高管"经济人"与"政治人"的双重属性使其在投资决策中的个人动机趋于复杂。本文糅合了代理理论和管家理论对国有企业高管的自我认识解释,并引入"从严治党"的情境对国企党组织的投资治理作用进行理论与实证分析。研究发现,国有企业党组织的治理参与能够提升企业投资效率、发挥积极的投资治理作用,包括抑制过度投资与提升对投资机会的捕捉能力;但是,这一效应主要体现于中央企业,党组织对地方国有企业的投资治理效应仍然不甚明显。不过无论是在理论上还是在实践中,国有企业在推进内部党组织融入企业治理层面的过程,要确保"从严治党"长效机制的构建。

The dual attribute of＂economic man＂and ＂politician man＂of SOEs＇ senior executives make their personal motivations be more complicated during investment deciding. This paper mixes two different self-knowledge explanations from ＂agency theory＂and ＂stewardship theory＂for SOEs＇ senior executives,and then makes theoretical and empirical analysis of investment governance effect of SOEs＇ party organization under the situation of ＂strict administration of the Party ＂. This paper finds that party organization＇ s governance participation could promote SOEs＇ investment efficiency,and have positive effect on investment governance,including reducing Over-investment and promoting the ability of capturing investment chances; this kind of effect mainly exists in central enterprises,while it is still insignificant in local state-owned enterprises. However,whether it is in theory or in practice,in the process of state-owned enterprises promoting the internal party organizations into corporate governance level,we should ensure the construction of long-term mechanism of ＂strict admimstration of the party＂.