财政R&D补贴、地方政府行为与企业创新

Financial R&D Subsidy, Local Government Behavior and Corporate Innovation

本文借助中国2007—2014年上市企业与宏观经济数据集,检验财政R&D补贴及地方政府行为对企业创新的影响及其发生机制。研究表明,财政R&D补贴所引致的企业创新投入产出效应有着极强的异质性。更进一步,地方政府的绩效考核压力促进了财政R&D补贴效果,但财政失衡问题依旧是有效使用财政R&D补贴的桎梏。此外,政府强烈的补贴意愿有可能面临企业的"迎合"行为,并造成企业融资需求的挤出效果,最终不利于企业的创新研发活动。基于此,想要改善财政R&D补贴的创新绩效,就必须从绩效考核和财税激励结构入手,导出针对地区异质性的政策路径。特别地,如何释放财政R&D补贴信号,以实现"政府—市场"的联动,是实现企业创新驱动的重要路径。

This paper examines the impact of fiscal R＆D subsidy and government behavior on enterprise innovation and its mechanism by using listed companies and macroeconomic data sets from 2007 to 2014 in China. The research shows that the financial R＆D subsidy has the strong heterogeneity of the enterprise input and output effect. In the economic transition period, the local government＇s performance appraisal pressure helps promote the financial R＆D subsidies, but the financial imbalance remains the shackles of financial R＆D subsidies. Furthermore, with the government＇s strong willingness to subsi- dize, enterprises intend to cater to the government＇s call, thus creating a squeezing effect of corporate financing demand, which is ultimately detrimental to the enterprise＇s innovative R＆D activities. Based on this, in order to improve the financial R＆D subsidies for innovative performance, we must start from the performance appraisal and tax incentives to guide the regional heterogeneity of the policy path. In particular, how to release the financial R＆D subsidy signal to achieve the ＂government-market＂ linkage, is vital to achieve enterprise innovation drive.