官员晋升压力与产业结构升级——来自中国城市数据的证据

Government Officials' Promotion Pressure and Upgrading of the Industrial Structure: Evidence from the Data of City Officials in China

利用1999—2014年中国35个大中城市的市级官员晋升的微观数据与城市的匹配数据进行了实证检验,结果显示:晋升压力引发地方官员偏向性的产业选择和公共财政支出偏好,进而对产业结构转型升级产生显著抑制作用;官员晋升压力显著促进了第二产业发展,但对第三产业则产生抑制作用;官员晋升压力在一定程度上抑制了服务业内部的转型升级;政治会议周期强化了官员晋升压力对产业结构升级的抑制作用。

After carrying out the experimental tests by using the micro data of municipal officials＇ promotion of 35 large and medium-sized cities in China from 1999 to 2014 to match the city＇s data,the results show that the promotion pressure has brought out the biased industry choice and public expenditure preferences on the part of the local officials,and thus producing a significant inhibitory effect on the transformation of industrial structure and upgrading. The analysis has also found that the promotion pressure of officials has significantly promoted the development of the secondary industry,but it has an inhibitory effect on the service industry. In addition,the cycle of political meetings has strengthened inhibitory effect of the officials＇ promotion pressure on the upgrading of industrial structure.